Bit ValueValue, taken apart without the safari.

Aave’s Service-Provider Departures Put Its V4 Valuation Case to the Test

Originally reported by PANews on April 10, 2026, at 18:05 (UTC+8). Aave’s dispute with three service providers raises a valuation question: can a more coordinated V4 strategy improve value captured by the AAVE token without weakening the risk management and governance on which the lending protocol depends? The reported developments do not, by themselves, establish an answer.

What changed

On April 7, Chaos Labs announced that it would end its three-year risk-management relationship with Aave V2 and V3. It cited sustained losses, the departures of fellow contributors BGD Labs and Aave Chan Initiative (ACI), and a fundamental disagreement with Aave Labs over risk management for V4. Chaos Labs argued that V4’s hub-and-spoke design could increase capital efficiency while amplifying risk and adding to the work of managing V3 and V4 simultaneously.

Aave Labs said it respected the decision and that the protocol’s smart contracts and network deployments were unaffected. It also described a disputed renewal negotiation: according to Aave Labs, it supported raising Chaos Labs’ risk-management fee to $5 million but not an increase to $8 million without additional terms. Aave Labs said it opposed making Chaos Labs the sole risk manager, replacing Chainlink with Chaos Labs’ oracle, and making an unaudited Chaos Labs vault the default for all business-to-business integrations. During the transition, Aave Labs said LlamaRisk would take on broader risk coverage, with support for its staffing and budget.

On April 1, BGD Labs, a V3 technical service provider, announced it would end its technical contributions. BGD accused Aave Labs of constraining V3 development to advance an immature V4; these are BGD’s claims, not established findings. Governance service provider ACI, led by Marc Zeller, planned to leave in July. Zeller alleged that Aave Labs controlled 23% of the AAVE token supply and could use that voting power to overwhelm community proposals. The source does not provide the dataset or measurement date needed to independently assess that figure.

Activity is not token-holder value

The proposed “Aave Will Win” approach is part of the disagreement over Aave’s direction. The PANews article describes a potential return of 100% of frontend revenue to the DAO if the proposal is implemented. That is a conditional proposal, not an enacted distribution to AAVE holders. Frontend revenue, protocol revenue, DAO receipts and value accruing to token holders are distinct measures; the source does not supply the figures or rules needed to translate one into another.

The same distinction applies to operating claims. BGD said V3 accounted for 98% of Aave’s code, nearly all its total value locked and more than $100 million in annual revenue. Those figures are attributed to BGD; the article supplies neither a measurement date nor a revenue definition sufficient to use them as valuation inputs. PANews also reported that a March configuration error involving an Aave CAPO oracle under Chaos Labs’ responsibility undervalued wstETH by about 2.85% and triggered roughly $27 million of liquidations of otherwise healthy positions. That episode is relevant to operational risk, but it does not quantify the risk of V4 or establish a token valuation.

For an AAVE valuation argument, the unresolved inputs are whether V4 changes sustainable activity and revenue, what costs and risks accompany the transition, and what mechanism—if any—passes economic value from the DAO to token holders. The service-provider departures make those assumptions more consequential; they do not prove either a higher or lower fair value.

Source: panewslab.com (originally published 2026-04-10 18:05 UTC+8)