Historical source: Published by 库里 at TechFlow on November 9, 2026, at 18:31:37 (UTC+8), discussing a Vitalik Buterin post dated November 8.
The valuation question: can fee burning support ETH’s market value?
According to TechFlow’s account of Vitalik Buterin’s argument, Ethereum’s fee-burning mechanism does not establish a dependable valuation floor for ETH. The central problem is not simply how much ETH is burned, but whether the activity generating those fees can sustain itself independently of crypto prices.
TechFlow describes a valuation framework associated with the 2021–2023 period: divide annual burned fees by a discount rate to estimate ETH’s market capitalization. In that framework, EIP-1559’s removal of ETH from circulation becomes the basis for a cash-flow-like valuation.
Buterin’s objection, as reported by TechFlow, is that much of the fee demand came from leverage and speculation within crypto itself. The article cites a Yuga Labs virtual-land sale that reportedly generated $180 million in burned fees in a single day. If ETH’s price falls sharply, the purchasing power and profitability supporting such activity can fall with it. That makes fee burning a price-sensitive input, rather than an independent floor beneath the asset’s value.
The reported gap between actual and required burning
TechFlow presents the following figures:
| Measure | Figure reported in the article |
|---|---|
| ETH burned during 2022 | Approximately 1.48 million ETH |
| ETH burned in 2026 through the reporting period | 19,200 ETH |
| ETH burned in the 30 days through November 8, 2026 | 2,694 ETH, worth approximately $6 million |
| ETH market capitalization used in the argument | Approximately $272 billion |
| Assumed discount rate | 4% |
| Annual burning required under that valuation framework | Approximately 4.89 million ETH |
The article says burning over the preceding 30 days was insufficient to offset new issuance. It also reports six consecutive weeks of net outflows from U.S. spot ETH ETFs as background to the valuation debate.
TechFlow attributes the decline in mainnet burning to activity moving onto Layer 2 networks. It reports a roughly 149-fold gap between actual burning and the annual amount required by the model, but does not specify the precise annualization basis for that comparison.
These figures are reported inputs, not an independently verified valuation. The supplied article does not identify the underlying burn dataset or ETF-flow provider. Burning reduces token supply; treating that reduction as equivalent to distributable cash flow remains a valuation assumption, not a payment received by holders.
Why not run Ethereum like a large company?
TechFlow reports that Buterin compared Ethereum with L’Oréal, a company of similar scale in the discussion. Supporting ETH’s valuation through commercial growth, the argument goes, could require substantial research and market-development spending—approximately 700,000 ETH annually in protocol-level financing—alongside more interventionist governance.
The trade-off is institutional rather than merely financial. Pursuing greater fee revenue could mean higher gas costs, potentially excluding users who need privacy and security. Protocol-level financing and active governance could also weaken decentralization and resistance to capture.
In TechFlow’s account, Buterin favors preserving Ethereum’s neutrality over maximizing fee-derived value.
A store-of-value thesis changes the assumptions
The alternative described in the article is to anchor ETH’s value in its role as a store of value rather than primarily in burned fees.
That argument rests on decentralization and what the article calls CROPS: censorship and capture resistance, open source, privacy, and security. TechFlow presents Buterin’s position as emphasizing these properties as sources of durability, particularly amid institutional participation and AI-driven disruption.
For holders, the proposed emphasis shifts toward securely and privately holding assets and transferring them without censorship. It does not supply a numerical fair-value estimate or demonstrate how large a monetary premium those properties should command.
TechFlow’s author interprets this shift as an adjustment to weaker burning and price pressure under Ethereum’s rollup-centric scaling strategy. The author argues that abandoning the “ultrasound money” cash-flow framing could entail market repricing, while potentially strengthening Ethereum’s longer-term foundations. That is the author’s interpretation—not an established price outcome.
The analytical distinction is between network activity, the supply effect of fee burning, and demand to hold ETH. A store-of-value thesis changes which assumptions carry the valuation; it does not eliminate the need to substantiate them.